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ABSTRACT
We continue to see increasingly widespread deployment of IoT de-
vices, with apparent intent to embed them in our built environment
likely to accelerate if smart city and related programmes succeed. In
this paper we are concerned with the ways in which current gener-
ation IoT devices are being designed in terms of their ill-considered
dependencies on network connectivity and services. Our hope is to
provide evidence that such dependencies need to be better thought
through in design, and better documented in implementation so
that those responsible for deploying these devices can be properly
informed as to the impact of device deployment (at scale) on infras-
tructure resilience. We believe this will be particularly relevant as
we feel that commodity IoT devices are likely to be commonly used
to retrofit “smart” capabilities to existing buildings, particularly
domestic buildings.
To the existing body of work on network-level behaviour of
IoT devices, we add (i) a protocol-level breakdown and analysis
of periodicity, (ii) an exploration of the service and infrastructure
dependencies that will implicitly be taken in “smart” environments
when IoT devices are deployed, and (iii) examination of the robust-
ness of device operation when connectivity is disrupted. We find
that many devices make use of services distributed across the planet
and thus appear dependent on the global network infrastructure
even when carrying out purely local actions. Some devices cease
to operate properly without network connectivity (even where
their behaviour appears, on the face of it, to require only local
information, e.g., the Hive thermostat). Further, they exhibit quite
different network behaviours, typically involving significantly more
traffic and possibly use of otherwise unobserved protocols, when
connectivity is recovered after some disruption.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Networks→ Network measurement.
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1 INTRODUCTION
It is widely believed that the number of Internet of Things (IoT)
devices is growing rapidly and will exceed 20 billion by 2020 [16,
25, 33]. A large part of this future growth is expected to come
from sensors, actuators and computation deployed in the built
environment. Governments, commercial organisations, and private
citizens are all experimenting with how IoT devices can make us,
our cities, and our infrastructure more efficient. Standards such
as Building Information Modelling (BIM) level 2 are increasingly
widely used to model building design and construction, and future
iterations (anticipated BIM levels 3 and 4) are expected to cover
development of the built environment and associated infrastructure
(e.g., transport, refuse, utilities, communications, health, education)
more broadly [43]. For example, the UK Government has required
“fully collaborative 3D BIM (with all project and asset information,
documentation and data being electronic) as a minimum” since
2016.1 Digitisation of our built infrastructure looks set to accelerate.
We focus here on domestic contexts: smart homes where typical
IoT devices might include environmental sensors, security cam-
eras, personal health and wearable devices, voice controlled assis-
tants, and robots. Other contexts seem likely to contain distinct
but overlapping devices. For example, smart hospitals might have
rather more wearable health monitoring and medical devices (drug
monitoring and delivery systems, pacemakers, etc.), and might per-
haps integrate smart medical robots to provide efficient end-to-end
workflow in the hospital [51]. In contrast, smart offices may share
versions of a number of smart home devices for environmental
sensing and control, while adding systems targeting the shared
workspace to provide features such as online resource and space
booking. Smart cities will include all of the above and will add
various infrastructure sensing and control systems for lighting,
parking, refuse collection, traffic control, and so on. All involve
both local and centralised processing of information with com-
plex data and information flow among heterogeneous components,
implying dependencies on a wide range of network services and
protocols [18].
The implications of this increased digitisation are not entirely
clear however. For example, recent data breaches have continued to
increase sensitivity to the potential impact on security and privacy
of widespread sensing, and a number of authors have examined the
network bandwidth implications of widespread IoT deployment. In
this paper we focus on a slightly different question: what are the
implications on our built environment in terms of resilience and
robustness if we come to rely on Internet-connected IoT devices?
1UK Government BIM level 2 mandate, http://bim-level2.org/en/ faqs/
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We begin to address this question by analysing data collected from
lab-based measurement of the behaviour and service dependency
of a range of domestic IoT devices covering different application do-
mains, manufacturers, and popularity (§2). We analyse the collected
data to understand traffic patterns, protocol usage, and service de-
pendencies for the devices we monitor (§3). We then look specifi-
cally at the robustness of these devices under network disruption,
examining how they respond to different types of interruption to
their connectivity (§4). Finally we put our study in context (§5) and
conclude (§6).
2 METHODOLOGY
To begin to understand the data types, rates, and traffic patterns
caused by different IoT devices, we deployed a set of commodity
off-the-self IoT devices in a small test area in an office in our lab,
and captured the Wi-Fi traffic generated by these devices. Other
occupants of the office were notified that the devices were present,
and we carefully did not analyse the data captured from the devices
for anything other than its gross network characteristics. The data
captured thus represents a “minimum” level of traffic, and so service
dependency, as the devices were not interacted with as they might
be in amore realistic deployment. Our aim in this work is to uncover
baseline data about network and service dependency of a selection
of devices rather than to study device behaviour “in the wild”. We
certainly hope to explore device behaviour of more devices in more
realistic deployment scenarios in the future but that is not the
subject of this paper.
Table 1 describes the commodity IoT devices we deployed. All
were connected to a local Netgear N600 Wireless Dual Band Router
WNDR3700v2 running Linux OpenWrt version 2.6.39.4 [36] either
wirelessly over standard 802.11b Wi-Fi or via an Ethernet cable,
allowing us to capture all traffic to and from each device. Figure 1
depicts the experimental setup. We also made a very simple mea-
surement of their energy consumption by connecting each device
to a TP-Link Smart Plug for a fixed interval and recording the mean
power consumption.
We categorise each device in one of two categories: (i) Hub
refers to IoT devices which discover and control other IoT devices;
(ii) Sensor refers to IoT devices which connect to the router and
then communicate directly with various cloud services without
using any Hub.
To collect data from all IoT devices in our network, we ran
monitor and collect scripts on the router. We first get a list of MAC
addresses of the devices. On the router, we run themonitor script on
the interface that provides Wi-Fi access to the devices, filtering the
traffic based on the MAC addresses of interest using tcpdump [44].
On the other side, we schedule a cron job to periodically upload
collected data to a local development machine for offline processing.
This was necessary both because processing on the router would
have been too slow given its limited processing capacity, and be-
cause the router has limited persistent storage, less than 50MB.
Finally, we analyse all the pcap files, focusing on packet headers
and control protocols such as DNS. For detailed packet analysis,
we used Wireshark [48], GraphViz [20] and a set of custom Python
scripts.
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Figure 1: The Hive Hub (1) and Arlo Security Camera Hub
(5) connect via wired Ethernet; the Hive Motion Sensor (9)
communicates with the Hive Hub using Zigbee, and the
Security Camera connects over Wi-Fi to the Arlo Security
Camera Hub. Devices 10, 11, 12 connect to the smart phone
over Bluetooth, and the rest (2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 and the control-
ling smart phone) connect over Wi-Fi. The router reaches
the Internet via a wired Ethernet connection to the Univer-
sity’s network. Detailed device descriptions are given in
Table 1.
The result was a dataset spanning 8th March, 2018 to 11th April,
2018 although, due to an unobserved device failure, the D-Link
Motion Sensor ceased interacting over HTTPS after just one day,
and ceased network activity altogether after just less than one week;
hence we only have data for that device from 4th April, 2018 to
10th April, 2018.
3 ANALYSIS
There are many different ways to understand the network commu-
nications behaviour of devices. In this section, we present analyses
of the traffic we collected from the setup shown in Figure 1, as
that traffic was transmitted and received by the devices listed in
Table 1. Our purpose is not to make generalised statements about
all IoT devices but to illustrate some of the ways commodity devices
behave and to consider the implications of those behaviours. We
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Device Hub/
Sensor
Link Type Protocols Secure/
Insecure
Energy
(W)
Avg. Bandwidth
(B/s)
1 Hive Starter Kit Hub [23] H Ethernet TCP, IGMP, ICMP S 1.8 120
2 TP-link Smart Plug [46] H Wi-Fi UDP, TCP S,I 2.05 100
3 Google Home Mini [19] H Wi-Fi UDP, TCP, IGMP,
ICMP
S,I 1.4 125
4 Amazon Echo Dot [5] H Wi-Fi UDP, TCP, ICMP S,I 1.95 125
5 Arlo Security Camera Base
Station [10]
H Ethernet,
Wi-Fi
UDP, TCP S,I 4.6 70
6 Foobot Air Quality Moni-
tor [15]
S Wi-Fi TCP S 1.79 18
7 Nest Smoke Alarm [35] S Wi-Fi UDP, TCP S,I NA 0.02
8 D-Link Motion Sensor [12] S Wi-Fi UDP, TCP, IGMP S,I 1.4 NA
9 Hive Motion Sensor [24] S Zigbee HA 1.2 S Battery NA
10 ParrotPot Smart Flower
Pot [38]
S Bluetooth V4.0 BLE S Battery NA
11 MiBand Smart Bracelet [49] S Bluetooth V4.0 S Battery NA
12 Smart Bluetooth Tracker [45] S Bluetooth V4.0 S Battery NA
Table 1: IoT devices and their traffic behaviour summary.
particularly look at the implications for service dependency and
device robustness in subsequent sections.
3.1 Protocol Breakdown
Figure 2 presents a breakdown of the entire month’s dataset by
application protocol (Figure 2a), and per device by network and
application protocol (Figures 2b and 2c). It is surprising to observe
how much NTP, DNS and mDNS is in use by two devices in particu-
lar, the Smart Plug and D-Link Motion Sensor. It is also interesting
to observe that only one device makes significant use of a classical
IoT protocol (MQTT, used by the Foobot), though the Nest device
also uses an IoT specific protocol (Weave) that was proprietary
until released into Nest’s developer platform in 2015. The rest use
standard web protocols such as HTTP and HTTPS.
Local Network. For pairing and device discovery, many IoT hubs
use low power and short range communication protocols to con-
nect to devices (sensors). These protocols include Zigbee (IEEE
802.15.4) [3], Lora [41], Zwave [50], Lightwave [31], Bluetooth [21],
RFID communication (LF (125–134 kHz), HF (13.56 MHz), UHF (433,
and 860–960 MHz)) [40]. In our setup we have a few devices directly
connecting to Hub using Zigbee, Bluetooth andWi-Fi, e.g., the Hive
motion sensor connects to the Hive Hub using the Zigbee protocol.
We have three sensor devices which communicate with smartphone
apps using Bluetooth and then those apps communicate with cloud
services over the smartphone’s Wi-Fi connection via the router.
Encrypted Traffic. One straightforward observation we can make
from the collected traffic traces is to observe the use of secure
communication protocols between IoT devices and the outside
world [17]. Figure 2c categorises traffic generated from each device
based on application layer protocols. All IoT devices send at least
part of their traffic using HTTPS, with Hub devices sending more
(>50%) compared to Sensor devices. However we have not yet
investigated how secure is the use of HTTPS by different devices
in terms of selection of appropriate encryption suites and TLS
configurations.
3.2 Traffic Characterisation
Figure 3 shows bandwidth consumption by considering aggregate
bytes transmitted and received in 15minute windows over one
week.
The upward spikes shown for the Hive Hub (Figure 3a), Smart
Plug (Figure 3c) and Security Camera (Figure 3f) are caused by
devices receiving software updates, while the downward spikes are
due to network congestion at the local router due to a Google Home
software update early in the morning of 6th April (Figure 3d).
Amazon Echo (Figure 3e), Nest Smoke Alarm (Figure 3g) and
D-Link Motion sensor (Figure 3h) showed some periodic upward
spikes associated with frequent software updates. A high spike in
the Security Camera Hub (Figure 3f) is due to the camera image-
capture triggered by its motion sensor. In summary, we found > 99%
of the Hive Hub’s (Figure 3a) and Security Camera Hub’s (Figure 3f)
total traffic is composed of HTTPS packets and the remaining traffic
comprises a few periodic DHCP, NTP and DNS interactions.
The majority of Foobot’s (Figure 3b) traffic consists of MQTT
running over TCP. Some of the devices, e.g., Smart Plug (Figure 3c),
Amazon Echo (Figure 3e) and D-Link Motion sensor (Figure 3h),
send frequent NTP traffic, and we see it forms a significant percent-
age of total traffic sent by these devices. As compared to all other
devices, the traffic rate generated by Nest Smoke Alarm is small
when it is in its ideal listening mode; it sends just 6 packets per day
(totalling around 180 bytes per day). Nest Smoke Alarm uses the
Weave protocol over TCP to communicate twice a day to the Nest
Cloud Service.
We then analysed traffic from each device for periodicity across
all active protocols during one week, 3rd April 2018 to 10th April
2018. We applied Discrete Frequency Fourier Transform (FFT) to
detect periodicity in network duty cycle, and we present normalised
Yadav et al.
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Traffic Breakdown by Application Layer Protocols
(a) Total traffic captured, by application.
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(b) Total traffic per device, by network protocol.
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(c) Total traffic per device, by application.
Figure 2: Traffic breakdown by protocol and device.
the FFT magnitude vs frequency (cycles/week) in Figure 4. Our
devices appear to all use DNS and DHCP periodically with other
protocols typically used more intermittently.
We see that the Hive Hub uses only three application protocols
(Figure 4a) with periodicity of 28 cycles/week for DHCP traffic, an
average of 4 DHCP requests every day. DNS traffic shows different
periodic cycles 7, 14, 21, 28, 35, 42, 49 cycles/week. It means some
DNS requests frequency were in the range of 1 request per day to 7
requests per day. The Foobot network usage is aperiodic for three
protocols with only DHCP showing periodicity at 32 cycles/week,
i.e., 4–5 DHCP requests/day (Figure 4b). Out of three protocols
used by Smart Plug, we see periodic behaviour with DHCP with
two clear peaks, 24 and 28 cycles/week. However, there is some
cyclic behaviour in DNS which means the device is making many
DNS requests with periodicity 7, 14, 21, 35, 42 cycles/week as well
(Figure 4c). Google Home uses seven application layer protocols
and found four of them show some periodic behaviour. There are
continuous NTP requests with a periodicity of 7, 14, 21, 35, 42, 49
cycles/week. DHCP period is strongest at 28 cycles/week, but shows
smaller peaks for 7, 14, 21, 35, 42 (Figure 4d).
We also observed activity for GCM (Google Cloud Messaging)
and HTTPS (analysed in the next section) at 1–2 cycles/week. Ama-
zon Echo traffic composed of six protocols and DHCP and mDNS
showed clear periodicity pattern at 28 cycles/week whereas HTTPS
traffic showed periodicity 2–4 and 28 cycles/week in Figure 4e.
Security Camera Hub showed clear periodicity for DHCP 18 cy-
cles /week and various frequency peaks in DNS and NTP traffic as
shown in Figure 4f. Nest Smoke Alarm showed periodic behaviour
with all three protocols exhibiting frequencies 7, 14, 21, 28, 35, 42,
49 cycles/week (Figure 4g). D-Link Motion sensor showed periodic
behaviour at 1 and 28 cycles/week, (Figure 4h). However, as noted
above, this device suffered some unnoticed failure after just one
day resulting in HTTPS traffic ceasing to be observed.
3.3 Protocol & Service Dependency
It is inevitable that IoT devices in deployment will depend on con-
nectivity via a range of Internet protocols, both locally and to poten-
tially many cloud-hosted services. We now examine some of these
protocol and service dependencies for the devices we measured to
illustrate some of the complex dependencies our infrastructure will
take on if we increasingly deploy commodity IoT devices.
NTP usage in particular varied considerably between different
devices, in terms of both the servers accessed and frequency. Some
devices, e.g., the Hive Hub, used NTP during the setup process only.
Some, e.g., the Foobot air quality monitor and Nest Smoke Alarm,
use embedded timing protocols via MQTT and Weave rather than
NTP. All those using NTP communicated with NTP servers run by
the manufacturer except for the TP-Link SmartPlug which made
extensive use of the global NTP Pool project servers [37].
Finally, we performed IP geolocation (using IP address allocation
and routing data to infer the geographical location of a host with
a particular IP address) to estimate the different countries hosting
the services used by our devices. We used a command line utility
on Linux platform, geoiplookup, to get the geolocation of a given IP
address. For each combination of IoT device and application layer
service, we aggregate the country names (also state names when the
country is the USA) based on the ensemble of the IP addresses that
the device communicates with. We filter out the NTP dependencies
for Amazon Echo and Smart Plug as they each accessed tens of
different locations due to their unusual usage pattern for NTP and
DNS. We also extract some preliminary temporal information to
describe the relative activeness of the communication: we divide
the trace for each device into 15-minute windows and calculate
the percentage of active windows, those where communication
to/from a specific location actually happens. The results are shown
in Figure 5.
Both the TP-Link Smart Plug and D-Link Motion Sensor make
a large number of DNS queries to global NTP servers (Figure 6).
The total DNS traffic generated by just 4 devices makes nearly 12%
of total traffic generated from our setup. On the other hand, Hive
Hub and Foobot air quality monitor make very few DNS queries to
their servers. As we can see, most locations are quite inactive, with
fewer than 10 locations where >50% windows are active.
4 EFFECTS OF NETWORK DISRUPTION
Table 2 identifies seven different configurations for our experimen-
tal setup, each with different disruptions to device connectivity. We
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Figure 3: Per-device bandwidth used over one week, in 15minute buckets. Note variation in y-axis scales. As noted above, an
unobserved device failure truncated the D-Link Motion trace after one day for HTTPS and completely after one week.
State Internet Local router Devices
#1 Steady state On On On
#2 Internet disconnected Off On On
#3 Internet resumed On On On
#4 Router power-off Off Off On
#5 Router power-on Off On On
#6 Internet resumed On On On
#7 Device restarted On On Off→On
Table 2: Experimental states use to examine effects of
network disruption on devices.
start with network and devices in steady state (#1), with all devices
powered on, connected to the local router and thus to the Internet.
In our first experiment, we examine transitions from (#1)→ (#2)
→ (#3), simulating Internet service interruption and recovery. We
first cut off the Internet connection at the router by unplugging
it from the University’s network, and leave it unplugged for an
hour to stabilise. In the meantime, we run scripts on the router
to capture traces from the local network. We then reconnect the
Internet connection to the router, and collect packet traces for a
further hour.
Figure 2b shows the transport-layer traffic generated in steady
state (#1), while Figures 7a show the equivalent after disconnecting
the Internet (#2). After disconnection there is a significant increase
Yadav et al.
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Figure 4: The periodicity of activity visible on the traffic generated for each device over one week by applying an FFT to the
time-series data.
in UDP traffic for all devices, while TCP traffic is reduced to zero
for all except the Foobot. The UDP traffic is mostly composed of
DNS queries. The Security Camera Hub significantly increased
the amount of DNS (∼30 kB) and DHCP (∼10 kB) traffic in the
following hour. All hub devices (Hive Hub, Google Home, Echo,
and Camera Hub) also significantly increased their ICMP traffic,
presumably attempting to diagnose the interruption and perhaps
recover quickly when service is resumed; sensor devices continue to
emit negligible ICMP traffic. Foobot and Echo are the only devices
which transmit TCP traffic to the local router, Foobot’s composed
of MQTT and Echo’s of HTTP. The Nest Smoke Alarm neither sent
nor received packets in this interval and so failed to detect lack of
Internet connectivity.
Figures 7c shows that only four application-layer protocols of
the ten active in steady state were operational while there was no
Internet connectivity (#2). During this period, only the TP-Link
Smart Plug and Nest Smoke Alarm functioned as usual. Amazon
Echo Dot and Google Home Mini responded to their wake words,
but could only direct the user to check Internet connectivities. For
all other devices, their respective apps showed them to be off-line,
requiring user intervention. No devices seemed able to send HTTPS
or HTTP traffic, severely limiting their functionality.
We then observe what happens when Internet connectivity re-
sumes and we transition from (#2) to (#3). Figures 7b and 7d show
the traffic generated when resuming. We see that only two of the
four hubs (Hive Hub and Google Home) continue sending ICMP
traffic, and only two devices (Hive Hub and D-Link Motion sensor)
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Figure 5: Geolocated service accesses by device.
keep issuing IGMP requests. Five of the eight devices sent some
TCP traffic in this state, suggesting that they detected connectivity
had recovered. The Smart Plug and D-Link Motion sensors did not
start sending any TCP but sent only DNS and NTP traffic, perhaps
indicating both devices need to update global time before any TCP
connection could be made. All devices continued to send UDP traf-
fic, primarily DNS queries but the frequency reduced by > 50%
compared to (#2).
Google Home only sent traffic composed of three Application
layer protocols (MQTT, HTTP and DNS), showing that Google
Home remains partially functional in (#3) for at least an hour. Echo
and Camera Hub showed similar behaviour, both devices stopped
ICMP traffic and sent DNS and HTTPS traffic. The DNS traffic of
Camera Hub is reduced to nearly ∼1 kB from 35 kB per hour.
Figure 9 shows the results of our second experiment where we
examine network transition from states (#3) → (#4) → (#5) →
(#6) per Table 2: having removed Internet connectivity, we then
power off the router (#4) and test functionality of the two surviving
devices from the first experiment. As expected, the Smart Plug’s
app works whether or not Internet connectivity is available as it
only relies on local connectivity, but Nest Smoke Alarm’s mobile
app shows nothing about this disrupted connectivity as the user
can still trigger an alarm check on the device through its Bluetooth
connection. After the check, we turn the router’s power back on,
(#4)→ (#5). We schedule a script to start collecting network traces
right after the system finishes booting. We again remain in that
state for an hour before turning the Internet back on at the router,
(#5)→ (#6). We summarise Internet dependency of the devices in
Table 3.
Figures 8a and 8b show the effect when the router is powered
on but Internet is still disconnected, i.e., (#5). We see that only
three transport-layer protocols (ICMP, IGMP and UDP) generate
significant traffic in that hour, and there was no TCP traffic. All
devices generated significant UDP traffic (> 20 kB in first hour) as
compared to (#2) which suggests current state behaviour depends
on previous state. Google Home generated >250 kB of ICMP and
UDP traffic with UDP traffic composed of DNS and SSDP. We found
Echo behaved strangely after the router restart as it didn’t detect
the router automatically, instead connecting to our institution’s
open Wi-Fi network, resulting in missed traces from Echo.
The effect of the transition from (#5) → (#6) is shown in Fig-
ures 9a and 9b where Internet connectivity is restored at the local
router. We find that all ten application-layer protocols exhibit traf-
fic, and all devices resume their normal functionality. Smart Plug
(∼55 kB), Google Home (∼45 kB) and Camera Hub (∼15 kB) sent
significant DNS traffic in the first hour. The magnitude of total
traffic generated by devices is nearly 10 times more than in state
(#3), even though both states are superficially similar. This suggests
that local router restart does briefly create a measurable increase
in IoT traffic.
Figure 10 summarises traffic in the first 5minutes after transi-
tioning (#6)→ (#7). In this state, devices are restarted one by one
while the router remains powered on and Internet connected. After
each device is restarted, we carried out one activity with it to ensure
it was functioning normally. Each device was then kept idle for the
rest of the measurement time. We analysed traffic from the 5mins
immediately after the device was restarted, and summarise this in
Yadav et al.
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Figure 6: Summary of locations accessed by the NTP services.
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Figure 7: Traffic breakdown by transport- and application-layer Protocols for each device when network settings shown in
Table 2 are changed from the state (#1)→ (#2), and (#2)→ (#3).
Device Functionality Services Continued Services Disrupted
1 Hive Starter Kit Hub [23] Partial DNS DHCP, HTTPS
2 Foobot Air Quality Monitor [15] Partial DNS, MQTT, DHCP HTTP
3 TP-Link Smart Plug [46] Partial DNS NTP, HTTPS, DHCP
4 Google Home Mini [19] Partial DNS HTTP, NTP, HTTPS, SSDP, GCM, mDNS
5 Amazon Echo Dot [5] Partial DNS, HTTP NTP, HTTPS, DHCP, mDNS
6 Arlo Security Camera Hub [10] Partial DNS, DHCP NTP, HTTPS
7 Nest Smoke Alarm [35] Partial DNS Weave, DHCP
8 D-Link Motion Sensor [12] Partial DNS NTP, DHCP, HTTP, HTTPS, mDNS
Table 3: Observed dependencies.
Network Service Dependencies in Commodity Internet-of-Things Devices
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Figure 8: Traffic breakdown by transport- and application-
layer protocols for each device when network settings
shown in Table 2 are transition states, (#4)→ (#5).
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Figure 9: Traffic breakdown by transport- and application-
layer protocols for each device when network settings
shown in Table 2 are transition states, (#5)→ (#6).
Figure 10. To our surprise, all devices generated traffic equivalent
to the traffic generated in state (#6) (one hour) in that 5mins period.
Compared to other previous states we observed the Echo traces to
show port access queries – both HTTP and HTTPS – which were
not previously observed. Also the Nest Smoke Alarm generated a
total of∼35 kB of traffic in that 5min period after restart, suggesting
device restart increases network traffic.
5 RELATEDWORK
The challenges posed by the current state of the IoT ecosystem
are widespread, providing individual, technological and societal
threats. In this context we define a threat as the danger resulting
from exploitation of vulnerabilities in a system causing potential
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Figure 10: Traffic breakdown by transport- and
application-layer protocols for each device when network
settings shown in Table 2 are changed from the state (#6)
→ (#7).
harm [9, 11]. For example, Bugeja et. al [11] analyse the potential
threat agents in home IOT environments and classify them based
on their motivations and capabilities. The various threat agents
include nation states, terrorists, competitors, and criminals. Their
various motivations involve curiosity, personal gain, terrorism, and
national interest. To minimise possible threats, deployments will
need to provide for various security requirements: authentication,
confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation and availability [2, 39].
Additionally, privacy risks and Human-Data Interaction challenges
must be managed, with support for data subjects’ rights to control,
edit, manage and delete information about themselves, as well as
deciding when, how and the extent to which information about
them may be communicated to others [34, 47].
Recent years have seen both privacy and security perspectives
explored, analysed and presented in many research articles, e.g., [9,
11]. However, there has been relatively little research on how the
critical end-to-end services and infrastructure components of the
IoT ecosystem could affect scalability, availability, and integrity
of these systems. In response, we focus here on understanding
the threats linked to the scalability, availability, and integrity that
deployment of commodity IoT devices will create.
Abomhara et al [1] analyse IoT threat types and characterise
intruders and attacks facing IoT devices and services. Connected de-
vices are found to be rather valuable to cyber-attackers for several
reasons: (i) most IoT devices operate unattended by humans, so it
is easy for an attacker to gain physical access to them; (ii) most IoT
components communicate over wireless networks without requir-
ing encryption, so attackers might obtain confidential information
simply by eavesdropping; (iii) most IoT components cannot sup-
port complex security schemes due to low power and computing
resource capabilities. 2
2Indeed, we observed this ourselves when we struggled to get one of our devices con-
nected because our institution’s wireless network policy mandated an enterprise-level
Yadav et al.
Others have recently carried out similar analysis and studies
looking into various IoT traffic features, though most focus on pri-
vacy and security. Abomhara et al [1] analysed IoT threat types and
characterise intruders and attacks facing IoT devices and services.
Apthorpe et al [8] discusses privacy leakage from DNS queries and
encrypted traffic. Duo et al [14] consider what happens in different
scenarios were volumetric data generated between user and cloud
services from the compromised devices and app services is exposed.
They present a machine learning mechanism to learn the pattern
identifying a DDoS attack, install a corresponding filter at the edge
of the network, and discuss the amplification factor when services
are disrupted due to DDoS attacks.
Dainotti et al [13] discusses IoT network’s packet level traffic
analysis, inter-packet time and packet size. The analysis done in the
paper provides details such as delay, jitter and packet loss. Mahjabin
et al [32] discusses impact and scale of DDoS attack. Apthorpe et
al [7] suggests four strategies for protecting smart home privacy
from home network observers, for example, blocking traffic, con-
cealing DNS, tunnelling traffic, and reshaping traffic. Andradez et
al [6] studied the connection time of cars, both spatial and temporal
data to find correlation using the time series representation.
Lee et al [30] discuss sequential correlation between DNS queries
to show the temporal dependency and vulnerability. Allman et
al [4] discuss issues and etiquette concerning the use of shared
measurement data. Kumar et al [27] discuss the mis-issuance of
security certificate using Zlint, and found only 0.02% of certificate
are mis-issued. Lai et al [28] present an algorithm to visualise top
DNS server queries. Krohnke et al [26] discuss the impact of location
of DNS server on DNS query responses if, for example, it is within
only one AS or domain. Hahn et al [22] present interesting work on
detection and separation of compressed text from encrypted text
using k-nearest neighbour (60%) and 1D convoluted neural network
(66.9%).
Finally, Sivanathan et al [42] study IoT traces from a selection of
commodity IoT devices. They observe some similar properties to
those we report here, but focus analysis on active/inactive periods
(finding that most active periods are short), and on clustering ob-
served behaviours among their devices (finding approximately 5
clusters of network behaviour). They use these data and analyses to
classify and ultimately identify devices. In contrast, we analyse be-
haviour in more detail (traffic volumes and periodicity by protocol),
and we are particularly interested in the implications for resilience
of the built environment with respect to the dependencies we im-
plicitly take by widespread deployment of IoT devices through the
network connectivity and Internet services they rely upon.
6 CONCLUSIONS
The traffic capture and analysis presented here adds to the body
of work presenting the network-level behaviour of commodity IoT
devices. We add a protocol-level breakdown and more detailed
analysis of periodicity over a longer time period. This leads to an
exploration of the service and infrastructure dependencies that will
be taken in “smart” environments when IoT devices are deployed.
We thus also present analysis of some of these dependencies from
security protocol while the device only supported the commonly deployed domestic
security protocols.
a cloud service and geographical perspective, finding that many
devices make use of services distributed across the planet and thus
appear dependent on the global network infrastructure even when
carrying out purely local actions. Finally, we examine the robust-
ness of device operation when connectivity is disrupted, finding
that some devices cease to operate properly without network con-
nectivity (even where their behaviour appears, on the face of it, to
require only local information, e.g., the Hive thermostat). Further,
they exhibit quite different network behaviours, typically involving
significantly more traffic and possibly use of otherwise unobserved
protocols, when connectivity is recovered after some disruption.
This has implications for device behaviour profiling and firewalling
as proposed by, e.g., the IETF’s draft Manufacturer Usage Descrip-
tion (MUD) standard [29].
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